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Abstract
More recently, distributed variants of tuple spaces have been proposed to exploit the Linda model for
programming distributed applications over wide area networks, possibly exploiting code mobility.
However, the ﬂexibility of the shared tuple space model opens possible security holes; it basically
provides no access protection to the shared data. In this paper we investigate some possible
scenarios where mobile agents can beneﬁt from our cryptographic tuple space based framework,
CryptoKlava, and sketch how to possibly implement such agents in order to keep the privacy of
items collected by the mobile agent during its itinerary. The functionalities of the framework are
general enough to be applied to other Java frameworks using multiple distributed tuples spaces
possibly dealing with code mobility.
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1 Introduction
The Internet has been cursed by intrusions and attacks since the early days
[23,30,22]. Such intrusions used to exploit bugs in existing software in order
to gain access to the computer, replicate themselves, and spread to other
computers. Thus worms and viruses can rely on the concept of mobile code.
Indeed, the high ﬂexibility of mobile agents, and mobile code in general, do
not come at no cost. Downloading code from the network for local execution
1 This work has been partially supported by EU within the FET – Global Computing
initiative project MIKADO IST-2001-32222. The funding bodies are not responsible for
any use that might be made of the results presented here.
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exposes to possible threats at a higher level with respect to an isolated context
[26,8].
Distributed and mobile code systems raise new security issues mainly be-
cause they “violate a number of assumptions that underlie most existing com-
puter security measures” [11]. Assumptions that can be safely accepted for
isolated computers are destined to fall when the executing scenario scales to
an open network. Interesting features of mobile agents, such as, e.g., auton-
omy, also have drawbacks, since the owner of a system may ignore that remote
code is executing on his machine.
A successful approach to concurrent programming is the one relying on
the Linda coordination model [17]. Processes communicate by reading and
writing tuples in a shared memory called tuple space. Control of accesses
is guaranteed by requiring that tuples selection be associative, by means of
pattern matching. The communication model is asynchronous, anonymous,
and generative, i.e., tuple’s life-time is independent of producer’s life time.
The Linda model has been adopted in many communication frameworks
such as, e.g., JavaSpaces [2] and T Spaces [16], and for adding the tuple
space communication model to existing programming languages. More re-
cently, distributed variants of tuple spaces have been proposed to exploit the
Linda model for programming distributed applications over wide area net-
works [12,4], possibly exploiting code mobility [13,27]. As shown in [15], where
several messaging models for mobile agents are examined, the blackboard ap-
proach, of which the tuple space model is a variant, is one of the most favorable
and ﬂexible.
Sharing data over a wide area network such as the Internet, calls for very
strong security mechanisms. Computers and data are exposed to eavesdrop-
ping and manipulations. Dealing with these issues is even more important
in the context of code mobility, where code or agents can be moved over the
diﬀerent sites of a net. Malicious agents could seriously damage hosts and
compromise their integrity, and may tamper and brainwash other agents. On
the other hand, malicious hosts may extract sensible data from agents, change
their execution or modify their text [36,28].
The ﬂexibility of the shared tuple space model opens possible security
holes; it basically provides no access protection to the shared data. Indeed
there is no way to determine the issuer of an operation to the tuple space
and there is no way to protect data: a process may (even not intentionally)
retrieve/erase data that do not belong to it and shared data can be easily
modiﬁed and corrupted. In spite of this, within the Linda based approaches,
very little attention has been devoted to protection and access control.
In [6] we presented CryptoKlava, a Java middleware for building dis-
L. Bettini / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 128 (2005) 3–164
tributed and mobile code applications interacting through tuple spaces, by
means of cryptography. In this middleware, classical Linda operations are ex-
tended for handling encrypted data. Primitives are also supplied for encrypt-
ing and decrypting tuple contents. The proposed extension, while targeted to
our middleware for mobile agents interacting through distributed tuple spaces,
Klava [7], is still general enough to be applied to other Java frameworks using
multiple distributed tuples spaces possibly dealing with code mobility, such,
e.g., [27,2,12]. Indeed, this extension represents a compromise between the
ﬂexibility and open nature of Linda and of mobile code, and the privacy of
data in a distributed context.
The ﬁner granularity provided by CryptoKlava allows mobile agents
(that are not supposed to carry private keys with them when migrating) to
collect data encrypted with public keys, while executing on remote sites, and
decrypt them safely with private keys when back at the home site. In this
paper we investigate some possible scenarios where mobile agents can beneﬁt
from our cryptographic tuple space based framework and sketch how to pos-
sibly implement such agents in order to keep the privacy of items collected
by the mobile agent during its itinerary. All the software presented here is
freely available at http://music.dsi.unifi.it. The paper is organized as
follows: in Section 2 we describe the design issues of our framework and in
Section 3 we brieﬂy recall CryptoKlava’s main features. Section 4 presents
the mobile agent scenarios implemented with CryptoKlava and Section 5
compares our approach to some related works.
2 Distributed Private Generative Communications
The Linda communication model [17] is based on the notion of tuple space
that is a multiset of tuples. These are just sequences of items, called ﬁelds
that are of two kinds: actual ﬁelds, i.e., values and identiﬁers, and formal
ﬁelds, i.e., variables. Syntactically, a formal ﬁeld is denoted with !ide, where
ide is an identiﬁer. Tuples can be inserted in a tuple space with the operation
out and retrieved from a tuple space with the operations in and read (read
does not withdraw the tuple from the tuple space). If no matching tuple
is found, both in and read block the process that execute them, until a
matching tuple becomes available. Pattern-matching is used to select tuples
from the tuple space; two tuples match if they have the same number of ﬁelds
and corresponding ﬁelds do match: a formal ﬁeld matches any value of the
same type, and two actual ﬁelds match only if they are identical (but two
formals never match). For instance, if Val is an integer variable, then tuples
(“foo”, “bar”, !Val) and (“foo”, “bar”, 300) do match. After matching, the
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variable of a formal ﬁeld gets the value of the matched ﬁeld; in the previous
example, after matching, Val will contain the integer value 300.
The middleware CryptoKlava we presented in [6] is based on Klava [7],
a Java framework implementing Klaim (Kernel Language for Agent Interac-
tion and Mobility) [13] that provides features for programming distributed ap-
plications with mobile code and mobile agents, relying on communication via
multiple distributed tuple spaces. Klaim extends Linda by handling multiple
distributed tuple spaces: tuple spaces are placed on nodes (or sites), which are
part of a net. Each node contains a tuple space and a set of processes, and can
be accessed through its locality. Thus, classical Linda operations are indexed
with the locality of the node they have to be performed at. A reserved locality,
self, can be used to access the current execution site. Moreover in Klaim
processes are ﬁrst class data, in that they can be transmitted and exchanged
among sites, so that mobile code and mobile agent applications can be easily
programmed.
For guaranteeing privacy of data stored in tuple spaces we have extended
Klava with some cryptographic primitives. In our view, this extension is a
good tradeoﬀ between the open nature of Linda (and of mobile code) and data
privacy. In particular we aim at having this extension as smooth as possible,
so that the original model is not perverted.
The basic idea is that a tuple may contain both clear text ﬁelds and en-
crypted ﬁelds. All the encrypted ﬁelds of a speciﬁc tuple are encrypted with a
single key. This choice simpliﬁes the overall design and does not harm usabil-
ity of the system; it would be unusual that diﬀerent ﬁelds of the same tuple
are encrypted with diﬀerent keys. Encrypted ﬁelds completely hide the en-
crypted contents that they embody: they even hide the type of the contents.
This strengthens the secrecy of data (it is not even possible to know the type
of sensible information).
In line with the open nature of the Linda model, our main intention is
not to prohibit processes to retrieve data belonging to other processes, but
to guarantee that these data be read and modiﬁed only by entitled processes.
A shared tuple space is basically a shared communication channel: in such a
channel information can be freely read and modiﬁed.
At the same time one of our aims is avoiding that wrong data be retrieved
by mistake. Clear text ﬁelds of a tuple can be used as identiﬁers for ﬁltering
tuples (as in the Linda philosophy), but if a matching tuple contains encrypted
ﬁelds, which a process is not able to decrypt, it is also sensible that the tuple is
put back in the tuple space if it was withdrawn with an in. Moreover, in such
cases, a process may want to try to retrieve another matching tuple, possibly
until the right one is retrieved (i.e., a tuple for which it has the appropriate
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decryption key), and to be blocked until one is available, in case no such tuple
is found.
Within our framework it is possible to
• use tuple ﬁelds with encrypted data;
• encrypt tuple ﬁelds with speciﬁc keys;
• decrypt a tuple with encrypted ﬁelds;
• use variants of the operations in and read (ink and readk) to atomically
retrieve a tuple and decrypt its contents.
The modiﬁed versions of the retrieving operations, ink and readk, are
based on the following procedure:
(i) look for and possibly retrieve a matching tuple,
(ii) attempt a decryption of the encrypted ﬁelds of the retrieved tuple
(iii) if the decryption fails:
(a) if the operation was an ink then put the retrieved tuple back in the
tuple space,
(b) look for alternative matching tuples,
(iv) if all these attempts fail, then block until another matching tuple is avail-
able.
Thus the programmer is relieved from the burden of executing all these internal
tasks, and when a readk or an ink operation succeeds it is guaranteed that
the retrieved tuple has been correctly decrypted. Basically the original Linda
pattern matching mechanism is not modiﬁed: encrypted ﬁelds are seen as
ordinary ﬁelds that have type KCipher (as shown in Section 3). It can be
seen as an extended pattern matching mechanism that, after the structural
matching, also attempts to decrypt encrypted ﬁelds.
In case mobile code is used, the above approach may be unsafe. Indeed,
symmetric and asymmetric key encryption techniques rely on the secrecy of
the key (in asymmetric encryption the private key must be kept secret). Thus,
a fundamental requirement is that mobile code and mobile agents must not
carry private keys when migrating to a remote site (“Software agents have no
hopes of keeping cryptographic keys secret in a realistic, eﬃcient setting” [36]).
This implies that the above introduced operations ink and readk cannot be
used by a mobile agent executing on a remote site, because they would require
carrying over a key for decryption.
For mobile agents it is then necessary to supply a ﬁner grain retrieval
mechanism. For this reason we introduced also operations for the explicit
decryption of tuples: a tuple, containing encrypted ﬁelds, will be retrieved by
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a mobile agent by means of standard in and read operations and no automatic
decryption will be attempted. The actual decryption of the retrieved tuples
can take place when the agent is executing at the home site, where the key
for decryption is available and can be safely used. Typically a mobile agent
system consists of stationary agents, that do not migrate, and mobile agents
that visit other sites in the network, and, upon arrival at the home site, can
communicate with the stationary agents.
Thus the basic idea is that mobile agents collect encrypted data at remote
sites and communicate these data to the stationary agents, which can safely
decrypt their contents. Obviously, if some data are retrieved by mistake, it is
up to the agents to put it back on the site from where they were withdrawn.
This restriction of the protocol for fetching tuples is necessary if one wants to
avoid running the risk of leaking private keys. On the contrary, public keys
can be safely transported and communicated. By using public keys mobile
agents are able to encrypt the data collected along their itinerary.
Notice that there is no guarantee that a “wrong” tuple is put back: our
framework addresses privacy, not security, i.e., even if data can be stolen, still
it cannot be read. Should this be not acceptable, one should resort to a secure
channel-based communication model, and give up the Linda shared tuple space
model. Indeed the functionalities of our framework are similar to the one
provided, e.g., by PGP [37] that does not avoid e-mails be eavesdropped and
stolen, but their contents are still private since they are unreadable for those
that do not own the right decryption key.
An alternative approach could be that of physically removing an encrypted
tuple, retrieved with an in, only when the home site of the agent that per-
formed the in, notiﬁes that the decryption has taken place successfully. Such
a tuple would be restored if the decryption is acknowledged to have failed or
after a speciﬁc timeout expired. However, this approach makes a tuple’s life
time dependent on that of a mobile agent, which, by its own nature, is inde-
pendent and autonomous: agents would be expected to accomplish their task
within a speciﬁc amount of time. Moreover, inconsistencies could arise in case
successful decryption acknowledgments arrive after the timeout has expired.
3 The middleware CryptoKlava
Klava [7] is deployed as an extensible Java package, Klava, that deﬁnes the
classes and the run-time system for developing distributed and mobile code
applications according to the programming model of Klaim. In Klava pro-
cesses are instances of subclasses of class KlavaProcess and can use methods
for accessing a tuple space of a node: out(t,l), for inserting the tuple t
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into the tuple space of the node at locality l, read(t,l) and in(t,l), for,
respectively, reading and withdrawing a tuple matching with t from the tuple
space of the node at locality l. Moreover the method eval(P,l) can be used
for spawning a KlavaProcess P for remote execution on site l. Some wrapper
classes are supplied for tuple ﬁelds such as KString, KInteger, etc.
The extension of this package, CryptoKlava, provides the cryptography
features described in the previous section. We have used the Java Cryptog-
raphy Extension (JCE ) [31], a set of packages that provide a framework and
implementations for encryption, key generation and key agreement, and Mes-
sage Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms. JCE deﬁnes a set of standard
API, so that diﬀerent cryptography algorithms can be plugged into a system
or an application, without modifying the existing code. Keys and certiﬁcates
can be safely stored in a Keystore, an encrypted archive.
CryptoKlava is implemented as a subpackage of the package Klava,
namely Klava.crypto, so that it is self-contained and does not aﬀect the
main package. In the rest of this section we will brieﬂy describe the main
classes of the package Klava.crypto, implementing cryptographic features,
that are relevant to our context. We refer the interested reader to [5] for a
more detailed description.
The class KCipher is introduced in order to handle formal and actual ﬁelds
containing encrypted data. It can be seen as a wrapper for standard Klava
tuple ﬁelds. An actual encrypted tuple ﬁeld can be created by ﬁrstly creating
a standard Klava tuple ﬁeld (in the example a string) and then by passing
such ﬁeld to an instance of class KCipher:
KString s = new KString("foo");
KCipher ks = new KCipher(s);
Similarly the following code creates an encrypted string formal tuple ﬁeld (In
Klava a formal ﬁeld is created by instantiating an object from a Klava
class for tuple ﬁelds – such as KString, KInteger, etc. – through the default
constructor):
KString s = new KString();
KCipher ks = new KCipher(s);
The class Tuplex extends the standard Klava class Tuple, in order to
contain ﬁelds of class KCipher, besides standard tuple ﬁelds; apart from pro-
viding methods for cryptographic primitives, it also serves as a ﬁrst ﬁlter
during matching: it will avoid that ordinary tuples (containing only clear text
data) be matched with encrypted tuples. Once tuple ﬁelds are inserted into a
Tuplex object, the KCipher ﬁelds can be encrypted by means of the method
encode. For instance, the following code
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KString ps = new KString("clear");
KCipher ks = new KCipher(new KString("secret"));
Tuplex t = new Tuplex();
t.add(ps); t.add(ks);
t.encode();
creates a tuple where the ﬁrst ﬁeld is a clear text string, and the second
is a ﬁeld to be encrypted, and then actually encrypts the KCipher ﬁeld by
calling encode. Also encode can receive parameters specifying the key and
the algorithm for the encryption; otherwise the default values are used. The
method ensures that all encrypted ﬁelds within a tuple rely on the same key
and algorithm.
As for the retrieval operation, this can be performed either with the new
introduced operations, ink and readk, if they are executed on the local site
KString s = new KString();
KString sec = new KString();
KCipher ks = new KCipher(sec);
Tuplex t = new Tuplex();
t.add(s); t.add(ks);
ink(t, l);
Print("encrypted data is: " + sec);
or by ﬁrst retrieving the tuple and then manually decoding encrypted ﬁelds:
... // as above
in(t, l);
...
t.decode();
Print("encrypted data is: " + sec);
Notice that in both cases references contained in an encrypted ﬁeld (such
as sec) are automatically updated during the decryption. The ink in the
former example is performed at a remote site but this does not mean that
the key travels in the net: as explained in the previous section, the matching
mechanism is implicitly split into a retrieve phase (which takes place remotely)
and a decryption phase (which takes place locally).
Finally, let us observe that, thanks to abstractions provided by the JCE,
all the introduced operations are independent of the speciﬁc cryptography
mechanism, so both symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes can be
employed.
In the next section we will present a programming example of use of these
new cryptographic primitives; further examples can be found in [5].
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4 A mobile agent exploiting encryption
This example relies on the well known scenario of a migrating agent visiting
some sites and collecting information on behalf of the owner. During its
itinerary, the agent is exposed to attacks from the sites themselves or from
possible eavesdropping processes on other sites. The information collected by
the agent could be read and possibly modiﬁed by these intruders. Since this
information could be sensible data, it is important that it is not accessible by
no one but the owner of the agent and the agent itself.
For this reason the agent will encrypt, with the public key of its owner, the
data collected during its itinerary, so that, even if eavesdropped, these cannot
be read by intruders. The agent can safely travel with the public key, and the
collected data, once the agent has come back home, can be decrypted by the
owner by means of his private key. Unfortunately this does not come at no
cost: it is a well-known problem (see, e.g., [36]) that the agent is not able to
act according to the information collected during its itinerary since it cannot
decrypt data (it does not hold the private key):
KString s1 = new KString() ;
KString fString1 = new KString() ; // retrieve clear text data...
in(s1, fString1, self, 1000);
Tuplex txf1 = new Tuplex();
txf1.add(s1);
txf1.add(new KCipher(fString1));
txf1.encode(my public key) ; // ... encrypt it
collectedData.add(txf1) ;
if ( ! done ) {
// ... migrate to the next site
} else {
out(collectedData, owner) ;
}
Once the owner receives these data he can try to decrypt them, once they
are safely stored in its local tuple space:
// decrypt the collected data stored in the
// the local tuple space
...
while ( true ) {
Tuplex txf2 = new Tuplex() ;
KString s1 = new KString() ;
txf2.add( s1 ) ;
KString fString1 = new KString() ;
KCipher k = new KCipher( fString1 ) ;
txf2.add( k ) ;
if (ink nb( txf2, self, 100 )) {
out( "decoded", s1, fString1, self ) ;
} else {
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Print("All possible data decoded" ) ;
break ;
}
}
In the previous code, ink_nb is the non-blocking version of ink (the process
is not blocked if no matching tuple is available).
Let us now consider a slightly diﬀerent scenario: the sites visited by mobile
agents want to be sure that information destined to speciﬁc entities cannot
be read by others. Even in this case asymmetric encryption helps in solving
this problem: the site encrypts data for a person A with the public key of A.
This way, even if a mobile agent is able to retrieve data that does not belong
to its owner, these data will be useless since they cannot be decrypted. The
example we show here implements this scenario: the mobile agent retrieves
data according to a speciﬁc identiﬁer (represented here by the string s1). The
data related to this identiﬁer are encrypted. Once the itinerary of the agent
is over, the agent sends all the collected data to its owner.
Tuplex txf1 = new Tuplex() ;
KString s1 = new KString("item1") ;
txf1.add( s1 ) ;
KString fString1 = new KString() ;
KCipher k = new KCipher( fString1 ) ;
txf1.add( k ) ;
read(txf1, self) ;
collectedData.add(txf1) ;
if ( ! done ) {
// ... migrate to the next site
} else {
out(collectedData, owner) ;
}
Notice that the previous agent, instead of reading data through the tuple
("item1", !k)
could also read with the tuple
(!s, !k)
This way, it would be able to retrieve also data that is not pertinent with
"item1" (possibly data that do not belong to its owner). However the agent
owner will not be able to decrypt tuples that do not belong to him, since he
does not own the keys for decrypting them.
Moreover the type of encrypted data, for the sake of security and privacy,
is hidden, so the agent could also retrieve remotely encrypted tuples of the
form ("item1", !k) where k does not contain a string. In this case, at the
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owner site, such tuples would not be retrieved, since, during an ink or readk,
once an encrypted ﬁeld is decoded, its type is used for the actual matching.
5 Conclusions and Related Work
Since tuple space operations can be used both by local processes and by mo-
bile agents, the extended operations address both the privacy of hosts and of
mobile agents. We did not deal with key distribution explicitly that can be
seen as an orthogonal problem. Digital signatures can be smoothly integrated
in our framework and the pattern matching extended accordingly. We are
currently working on the addition of the presented cryptography primitives
to the kernel language Klaim and to the programming language based on
Klava, X-Klaim [5].
The work that is closer to ours is [9], which introduces the Secure Object
Space (SecOS) model. This model is intended to extend Linda with ﬁne-
grained access control semantics. In SecOS all tuple ﬁelds are locked with
a key, and each ﬁeld must be locked with a diﬀerent key. The basic idea
is that a process, upon retrieving a tuple, can see only the ﬁelds for which
he owns the corresponding key. The structure of a tuple does not inﬂuence
pattern matching: due to an introduced subsumption rule, a template can
match also a bigger tuple, and ﬁelds can be reordered during the matching.
[10] proposes a similar, but richer framework, SecSpaces, where also resource
access control and tuple space partitioning facilities are provided (orthogonal
and complementary to our approach).
All these features tend to alter the original Linda model and indeed the
SecOS calculus is based on the asynchronous π-calculus [1,21], exploiting
its channel-based communication mechanism. Our principal aim, instead,
is to provide an extension of the Linda communication model that can be
smoothly integrated into the existing features, without signiﬁcantly changing
the original model. As for communications among sites we rely on the Klaim
model, which can be seen an implementation of distributed tuple spaces.
Moreover, neither SecOS nor SecSpaces handle code mobility, which is
one of our main concerns. Mobility imposes additional restrictions on the un-
derlying model, e.g., requiring that agents do not carry private keys during
migrations, and calls for alternatives such as explicit encryption and decryp-
tion mechanisms and a two-stage pattern matching.
The problem of cryptography in a mobile scenario is investigated in [29].
There, techniques for achieving “non-interactive evaluation with encrypted
functions” are presented to avoid carrying clear text keys. With encrypted
functions, an agent is able to securely perform a cryptographic primitive,
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even in an untrusted execution environment. The approach makes use of
homomorphic encryption schemes and function composition techniques. At
the moment, however, no general scheme for achieving this has been found,
and thus no eﬀective implementation of these techniques is available.
An alternative approach to security is the one based on resource access
control. This is completely orthogonal to our approach and can be seen as
complementary to it. Here, we would like to mention access control mecha-
nisms based on granting or denying access to sensible resources according to
speciﬁc policies (e.g., based on the source of the request, digital signatures,
etc.). Type system based solutions are already available for access control in
a distributed and mobile scenario [14,19]. Java [3] relies on security policies
(possibly exploiting digital signatures) for implementing access control, espe-
cially for downloaded code [18]. Proof-Carrying Code [24] imposes mobile code
to also provide a proof that an host can easily verify in order to check whether
the code adheres to the local security policy. However, the diﬃculty in speci-
fying and eﬃciently encoding a proof makes the approach not implementable
in practice, at the moment.
Basically the above mentioned solutions deal with the issue of protecting
a host from mobile agents, and not with the problem of protecting a mobile
agent from a malicious host and from other agents: When a mobile agent is
executing on a remote host, it is almost completely defenseless, and indeed
the problem of protecting an agent against a malicious host is even more
complicated than the previous issues [20,25,28,32,33,34,35,36]. However, due
to the inherent nature of the problem, the provided solutions either limit
the ﬂexibility of mobile agents or allow only an a posteriori analysis of the
execution of agents.
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